LAB-EXP-301 — Metasploit Vulnerability Validation
Purpose
Use Metasploit Framework to correlate scanner evidence, select an appropriate module, perform a non-destructive check and—only after instructor approval—validate exploitability on a resettable target. The lab excludes persistence, lateral movement, credential harvesting and payload evasion.
Authorised scope
The only permitted target is 10.77.0.50. The learner workstation and target must be attached to the isolated Northstar lab network with no route to production or the internet. Destructive modules, denial-of-service, brute force, persistence, pivoting and data exfiltration are prohibited.
Learning objectives
- create a dedicated Metasploit workspace;
- import or correlate Nmap service evidence;
- search modules by service and vulnerability reference;
- review module documentation, targets, options and reliability;
- use
checkbefore exploitation where supported; - capture minimal proof and cleanly terminate sessions.
Task 1 — Initialise the workspace
msfconsole
workspace -a northstar-lab
workspace northstar-lab
setg RHOSTS 10.77.0.50
Record Metasploit version, database status, workspace and system time.
Task 2 — Collect non-exploitative evidence
Use an auxiliary scanner that matches the known service. Example:
search type:auxiliary ftp version
use auxiliary/scanner/ftp/ftp_version
set RHOSTS 10.77.0.50
set RPORT 21
run
Compare the result with Nmap and OpenVAS evidence. Do not proceed unless the service and target match the approved lab finding.
Task 3 — Review a candidate exploit module
The resettable lab target is designed for the classic vulnerable FTP service exercise. Review the module before use:
search type:exploit name:vsftpd
use exploit/unix/ftp/vsftpd_234_backdoor
info
show options
show targets
Document:
- vulnerability reference and affected version;
- module rank/reliability;
- required target conditions;
- network connections created;
- expected session type;
- cleanup and snapshot-reset requirements;
- why the module is prohibited outside this target.
Task 4 — Check first
Where the selected module supports it:
set RHOSTS 10.77.0.50
set RPORT 21
check
If check is unsupported or inconclusive, stop and record the limitation. Do not substitute a different exploit without a scope amendment.
Checkpoint: A scanner match and a module match are hypotheses. The check result, exact target state and controlled validation determine whether exploitability is demonstrated.
Task 5 — Instructor-approved exploitability validation
Proceed only after the instructor verifies the target snapshot and records approval. Run the selected module once:
run
sessions
If a session opens, collect only minimal proof:
sessions -i <session-id>
id
uname -a
exit
Do not browse user data, collect credentials, alter files, create accounts or establish persistence.
Task 6 — Cleanup and reset
sessions -K
jobs -K
workspace
exit -y
Then:
- reset the target snapshot;
- verify the service returned to its baseline state;
- confirm no sessions or handlers remain;
- preserve console output with secrets redacted;
- record start, approval, exploitation and cleanup timestamps.
Use the metasploit section of the synthetic evidence pack for browser-only delivery.
Task 7 — Report the finding
Your finding must distinguish:
- vulnerability identified by scanner;
- service/version evidence;
- module applicability;
checkresult;- controlled exploit result;
- privilege obtained;
- business impact in a real environment;
- remediation and compensating controls;
- exact retest method.
Evidence requirements
- workspace and tool baseline;
- auxiliary-scanner output;
- module-selection rationale;
- instructor approval record;
- check result;
- minimal exploit evidence;
- cleanup and reset confirmation;
- remediation and retest statement.
Knowledge check
1. Why use an auxiliary scanner before an exploit module?
It strengthens service and version evidence with lower operational impact and reduces blind module selection.
2. What does a successful session prove?
That the controlled target met the module conditions and permitted code execution or access under the tested circumstances; it does not automatically describe every production environment.
3. Why collect only minimal proof?
The assessment objective is vulnerability validation. Additional collection increases privacy, operational and legal risk without improving the core evidence.